

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ENHANCING AMERICAN INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION
FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM**

by

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ABSTRACT

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KEY TERMS: National Security Council (NSC), Combatant Commands (COCOMs), Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), Director of National Security Operations (DNSO), National Security Officers (NSOs), National Interagency Task Force (NIATF), National Integrated Operations Plan (NIOP), National Security University (NSU), Collaborative Information Environment (CIE), Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), Interagency Athletic Event Security Coordination Group (IAESCG), National Exercise Plan (NEP)

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This essay identifies opportunities to enhance interagency integration at the strategic and operational levels for the global war on terrorism. It begins with an assessment of strategic leadership in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and policy, in general, and counterterrorism strategy and policy, in particular. The essay concludes that the nation lacks an institutionalized mechanism within the National Security Council (NSC) structure to monitor the implementation of national security and counterterrorism strategy and policy. The essay also identifies a pronounced gap in the nation's capability to integrate all the elements of national power at the operational level. It further recommends the establishment of a new senior position on the NSC staff, the Director of National Security Operations (DNSO), supported with a small interagency staff, to monitor the implementation of national security strategy and policy and to close the national operational planning and execution gap. The essay then proposes several initiatives to enhance the capabilities of selected, key existing interagency counterterrorism capabilities and new enabling capabilities to enhance interagency integration in the pursuit of national security and counterterrorism objectives.

ENHANCING AMERICAN INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

This essay identifies opportunities to enhance American interagency integration at the strategic and operational levels for the global war on terrorism (GWOT). It begins with an assessment of strategic leadership in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy and policy, in general, and counterterrorism strategy and policy, in particular. The essay concludes that while the Bush Administration has wielded a clear and unified vision and strategy for winning the war on terrorism, demonstrating effective organization and management of the National Security Council (NSC) system in the formulation of strategy and policy, the nation currently lacks an institutionalized mechanism within the NSC structure to monitor the implementation of national security and counterterrorism strategy and policy. The essay also identifies a pronounced gap in the nation's capability to integrate all the elements of national power at the operational level. The essay recommends the establishment of a new senior position on the NSC staff, the Director of National Security Operations (DNSO), supported by a small interagency staff, to monitor the implementation of national security strategy and policy, and to close the national operational planning and execution gap.

The essay then proposes several initiatives to enhance the capabilities of selected, key existing interagency counterterrorism capabilities. Finally, the essay recommends the creation of new enabling capabilities to enhance interagency integration in the pursuit of national security and counterterrorism objectives.

Interagency Integration at the Strategic Level

The primary intent of Congress in passing the National Security Act of 1947 was to integrate all the elements of national power in the pursuit of national security objectives.¹ Congress had witnessed President Roosevelt's excessive compartmentalization of critical national programs and his frequent exclusion of key Cabinet members from national security decision making, and wanted to prevent the recurrence of such practices in successive administrations. Examples of these debilitating practices include the decision not to inform Vice President Harry S. Truman of the Manhattan Project and the intentional exclusion of Secretary of State Cordell Hull from war council meetings during World War II.

In the six decades since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, a number of scholars, former and sitting presidents and senior government officials, presidential candidates, presidential commissions, think tanks and media pundits have offered their assessments of how presidents from Truman to George W. Bush have exercised leadership and organized their

administrations to accomplish the nation's national security objectives.² This essay asserts that the Eisenhower administration provides the best model for effective presidential organization and management of the NSC staff and should be institutionalized.

The characteristics of the Eisenhower administration that appear most desirable are the following: 1) inclusion of all key principals and not just statutory members of the NSC in the formulation of strategy, policy and national security decision making; 2) restriction of the role of national security adviser to a low-visibility one of coordination and not one of policy advocacy; 3) organizational design of the NSC to allow policy development by the principals of the Cabinet rather than the national security advisor or the NSC staff through the mechanism of the Policy Planning Board (PPB) with representatives of the departments at the Under Secretary level; 4) organizational design of the NSC to permit the evaluation of policy implementation via the Operational Control Board (OCB), with representation similar to that of the PPB; and 5) a process approach designed to ensure that the President receive alternative points of view or even outright dissent via the procedure of outlining "splits" in the margins of policy documents presented to the President for decision.

The Eisenhower administration is the only one to include each of these characteristics since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Indeed, other administrations compromised national security and their own political futures on a number of occasions by deviating from this organizational and process model. For example, President Kennedy, acting both on a campaign pledge to "humanize" the NSC and citing the findings of the recently published Jackson Subcommittee Hearings, dismantled the formal organization of the NSC, dissolving both the PPB and the OCB.³ Former Kennedy aide Ted Sorenson later admitted that this decision was ill-advised and contributed in no small part in President Kennedy failing to hear alternative points of view that could have led him to disapprove the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.⁴ Presidents Ford and Carter both initially disbanded the Eisenhower innovation of using a chief of staff only to reinstate this position after learning they could not effectively manage the White House staff without one.⁵ Richard Nixon consciously sought to downgrade the position of Secretary of State by selecting William Rogers, who had no experience in foreign affairs, in order to emphasize his own central role in foreign policy formulation. President Carter failed to include Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at the meeting where he announced his decision to proceed with the hostage rescue operation that ended in failure in Iran. Several presidents allowed their national security advisors to usurp the Secretary of State's role as primary advisor for foreign affairs and few have kept their national security advisors from taking

active policy advocacy roles as opposed to merely coordinating the activities and advising the NSC principals.

The principals of the George W. Bush administration, including those who have left the administration, have yet to record their memoirs or speak publicly about the detailed workings of the Bush NSC, but one can make certain inferences regarding the administration's interagency integration at the strategic level. First, President Bush, in his initial National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 1), laid out a new structure for the NSC with four levels: the President, the Principals Committee, the Deputies Committee and a series of Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) organized along functional and regional areas of interest.⁶ He also used this document to expand the audience of the NSC beyond the statutory requirements. Records of NSC principals and deputies committee meetings indicate not only broad representation by responsible departments and agencies but also indicate that the attending officials (usually at least Under Secretaries) are sufficiently senior to effectively represent their principals.⁷ Second, there is no indication that any principals have been excluded from the process of national security decision making or policy formulation. Third, the Bush national security strategy and supporting functional strategies each emphasize the integration of all elements of national power. So it would appear that the President has organized his administration to ensure full interagency participation in advising him regarding national security decision making and the formulation of strategy and policy. What is not known yet, due to the paucity of evidence from the participants, is whether alternative views have been allowed or even encouraged as they were in the Eisenhower administration. One unanswered question is whether the current administration, in its efforts to work in a spirit of collegiality, has failed to advise the President of policy disputes or divergent opinions of the principals.⁸

President Bush acted with decisiveness, clarity and alacrity in laying out the strategic vision for America's counterterrorism efforts following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and this initial expression of strategic vision was followed by a succession of major efforts over time to include *inter alia*: the swift defeat of the Taliban and dispersion of al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan; the publication of a completely revised *National Security Strategy (NSS)*⁹ in September 2002; the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the publication of a national counterterrorism strategy¹⁰ in 2003; the authorization of the position of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004; and the publication of the first national intelligence strategy in October 2005. Each of these events shares one thing in common: they all emphasize the need to employ all the elements of national power in the war on terror.

Taken together, the *National Security Strategy* and the subordinate implementing strategies of the various departments and agencies, along with policies promulgated in the form of presidential directives¹¹ and selected congressional legislation, constitute the national-strategic level guidelines for American policy to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff publish the *National Defense Strategy*¹² and the *National Military Strategy*¹³ respectively. The State Department publishes its overarching strategy in several documents to include the *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009* which outlines State's broad objectives for diplomacy and international development,¹⁴ the Department's *Annual Performance Plan*,¹⁵ State Department regional bureau and functional bureau Annual Performance Plans, and chief of mission annual Mission Performance Plans (MPPs). Each of these documents addresses how the organization will support and implement the objectives of the national security and national counterterrorism strategies in accordance with its roles and capabilities. Other federal departments and agencies produce similar strategic plans.

While the cascading process of strategy formulation appears to work well, there is a critical shortcoming in the current process; there is no disciplined approach with adequate leadership and staffing to monitor the implementation of strategy and policy. Departments and agencies usually their performance reporting to congressional committees, generally not providing such reporting to the President and NSC other than in exceptional circumstances, and usually only in the context of annual budget submissions. Furthermore, there is no mechanism for ensuring that the various departments and agencies are working in concert. What is needed is an equivalent to the Eisenhower administration's Operational Control Board (OCB), which can monitor and evaluate implementation for the President and the NSC.

To solve this problem, this study recommends the establishment of a new position, the Director of National Security Operations (DNSO), assisted at the departmental level by several newly authorized Under Secretaries of International Operations, supported by a small interagency staff, as the focal point for monitoring the implementation of national security strategy and policy and providing the NSC with operational updates.

The DNSO position would be a new Assistant to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (ADAPNSA/DNSO), providing direct access to the President as a newly created senior staff position on the NSC staff, working directly for the Deputy National Security Adviser. It is unrealistic to assume that the Deputy National Security Advisor will have the time to personally manage implementation of strategy and policy, although that appears to be the current, temporary arrangement with the Deputy National Security Advisor overseeing a

newly created, small staff office in the NSC known as the Special Advisor for Policy Implementation and Execution.¹⁶ Nor will it be sufficient to simply direct the departments to monitor implementation and execution and to coordinate with one another and to integrate all their plans as *National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44)* requires for reconstruction and stabilization operations.¹⁷ The creation of the DNSO position would allow one individual to focus on implementation while serving as a bridge between the departments and the President.

The Congress should authorize several new positions to be called Under Secretaries of International Operations to discharge the implementation function. At a minimum, Congress should mandate and resource these positions for the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Commerce and Homeland Security. These new positions would alleviate the pressure on the principals and their deputies, and existing Under Secretaries, who simply do not have the time to effectively monitor implementation given their other significant responsibilities, thereby expanding their span of control. To simply devolve these new responsibilities to the departments without authorizing such new senior positions would invite failure.

The primary responsibility of the proposed DNSO position and his staff would be to monitor, on a continuous basis, the implementation of national security and counterterrorism strategy and policy decisions of the President and to advise the President and the NSC on progress and problems in implementation. They would maintain visibility of all departmental plans, to include all COCOM contingency plans from the moment those plans are initiated. For example, the Secretary of Defense would notify the DNSO of any COCOM plans from the moment he directs their development, such as through the mechanism of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or when any COCOM commander (CCDR) announces that he intends to draft a plan on his own authority. The DNSO would ensure that all stakeholder agencies are informed of all planning efforts and that they advise the DNSO of the assets under their control that could potentially assist other agencies in planning or conducting operations. This would represent a significant improvement in the nation's ability to integrate all the elements of national power toward common national security objectives. Just as DOD and the COCOMs would do in the example above, the other agencies would similarly inform the DNSO at the outset of their planning efforts.

The DNSO would then monitor the implementation and execution of all department and agency plans and incorporate them into a National Integrated Operations Plan (NIOP) that would provide a framework to synchronize all related interagency efforts for any given national security objective. The NIOP would be created from the bottom up and would not, at least in the near term, be driven top down as are current strategy and policy planning documents. For

example, the DNSO would integrate and support the development of operational plans by the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) but would not direct those actors in how to craft their plans. Guidance for these planning efforts would continue to emanate from the President, passing through the Cabinet principals to the combatant commanders, the NCTC and other planning agents. The President should outline in a presidential directive the DNSO's responsibilities and the interagency coordination procedures required for all participating agencies.

Closing the National Operational Planning and Execution Gap

Even if strategy and policy emanating from the President and the National Security Council are well-crafted, those strategies and policies will be little more than mere exhortations if they are not effectively implemented. This is one of the major challenges today in the prosecution of the war on terror – implementing policy and strategy through operational planning and execution. While the current administration has clearly articulated logical ends, appropriate ways, and feasible means in our national security and counterterrorism strategies, the nation nevertheless is constrained by the existence of a pronounced gap in its ability to achieve truly integrated operational planning, execution and evaluation.¹⁸ This operational planning gap is a critical vulnerability that puts at risk the nation's ability to achieve its strategic objectives. The gap is a major cause of the lack of interagency integration in national security operations.

Among the departments and agencies of the federal government, only DOD actually conducts detailed, complex operational planning. DOD attempts to include other elements of national power by including an Annex V in each of its COCOM plans. Annex V purports to indicate what tasks will be performed by departments and agencies other than those controlled by DOD. However, in reality the interagency tasks listed in COCOM plans are merely requests for support and lack authority to direct compliance. What is lacking is a high-level authority with the direct authority of the President who can *task* agencies to synchronize their operational capabilities with those of other agencies into national level plans.¹⁹

The national operational planning gap could be resolved by the same mechanism recommended to monitor the implementation of national security strategy and policy, that is, the creation of a new position of Director of National Security Operations (DNSO). This position would provide an operational mirror to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The very existence of a DNSO could also provide a means to insulate the DNI from executive invitations to take excursions into policy advocacy and the concomitant risks of tainting intelligence analysis in order to support policy recommendations.²⁰

The DNSO would be charged with maintaining a continuous operational planning capability that fuses the plans and operations of the various departments and agencies in pursuit of national security and counterterrorism strategic objectives.

But creating interagency mechanisms will not be enough to ensure success. For example, there has been a consistent and pronounced failure of the various departments and agencies to fully staff existing interagency mechanisms such as the JIACGs and the NCTC. This reluctance can be traced to two factors: a failure on the part of Congress to authorize additional end-strength to the departments to meet these obligations and cultures within the departments that discourage assignments outside the parent organization. To allay fears of potential detailees the departments and agencies should make a concerted effort to reassure their employees that such an interagency assignment will be considered career enhancing. The President should direct compliance via presidential directive.

This essay further recommends that the President direct the implementation of the emerging DOD operational planning concepts of effects-based operations (EBO) and operational net assessment (ONA) for all federal departments and agencies tasked with operational planning responsibilities. The implementation of EBO would focus all elements of national power on a given node (i.e., an actor or asset), such as an enemy or friend, to achieve articulated effects through the application of various actions from various national means.²¹ “Effects-based operations are actions that change the state of a system to achieve directed policy aims using the integrated application of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) instruments of national power.”²² EBO also includes a methodology for evaluation using measures of performance (did we do things right) and measures of effectiveness (did we do the right thing). “Operational net assessment [ONA] is the integration of people, processes, and tools that use multiple information sources and collaborative analysis to build shared knowledge of the adversary, the environment, and ourselves.”²³

In the short-term, the implementation of EBO and ONA should be implemented in support of the DNSO and the NCTC in order to jumpstart the implementation of these planning methodologies in the organizations with the greatest need and most pressing responsibilities. This effort would begin with these entities both because of pressing operational requirements that would benefit by use of EBO and ONA and also as a proof-of-principle in anticipation of expanding this effort to the wider interagency. The President should direct the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to task SOCOM to provide a small cadre of operational planners to support NCTC until that organization no longer needs operational planning assistance and to also task

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to provide training in the use of EBO and ONA for NCTC and the DNSO and his staff.

Enhancing Selected Existing Interagency Operational Counterterrorism Capabilities

Interagency Counterterrorism Capabilities Led by the State Department

The U.S. Department of State (State) is the lead federal agency for combating terrorism overseas.²⁴ State has a number of tools for accomplishing this mission. This essay focuses on two: U.S. country teams led by the chief of mission (COM)²⁵ in over 250 diplomatic posts in 180 countries abroad²⁶ and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT).

U.S. chiefs of mission (COMs) and their interagency country teams play a critical role in applying U.S. elements of power abroad and leveraging the assets of America's international partners. This latter task is critical to success in the GWOT. For example, two of the most important actions in the GWOT to date were the capture by Pakistani authorities of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9-11 attacks, and of the apprehension of Indonesian terrorist Hambali by Thai law enforcement. The very fact that America's terrorist enemies are operating on a global arena requires us to use all means at our disposal and this must include enhancing the capabilities, and optimizing the contributions, of America's international partners. America's international partners are critical force multipliers on an order of magnitude given our limited resources.

U.S. country teams apply the skills of interagency experts to prevent and respond to the consequences of terrorist activities and to identify, locate and conduct direct action against terrorists when possible. Most country teams include members of the intelligence community, federal law enforcement, the military and others. However, interagency assets assigned to U.S. country teams are rather thin, often consisting of a single representative from a given department or agency. The nation has learned from responding to crises that augmentation may be necessary. For example, in the wake of a number of different terrorist acts the U.S. has sent teams of FBI agents, Treasury Department financial experts, additional intelligence officers, and consequence management experts from various departments and agencies to augment the U.S. country team.²⁷ What the nation has not done sufficiently to counter international terror networks is to augment U.S. country teams with additional experts for long-term operations as proactive vice reactionary measures.

This essay recommends that the President direct the State Department, in concert with the other USG departments and agencies, to conduct a requirements analysis that examines the need to significantly augment U.S. country teams for such long-term operations with an

emphasis on expanding the capabilities that are so urgently needed to counteract terrorist networks to include law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorist financing. Congress would be enjoined to authorize and appropriate the necessary personnel and funds to carry out this mandate that could provide a significant boost to America's ability to prevent terrorist acts by disrupting terrorist networks abroad before they attain the capability to act. However, such a requirements analysis is likely to take over a year to complete and even longer to implement with congressional approval. Therefore, an interim solution is also proposed: the creation by presidential directive of a National Interagency Task Force (NIATF) that would pool enough experts from throughout the federal government to augment either U.S. chiefs of mission (COMs) or combatant commander (CCDR) operating at the front lines of the war on terror.

When not deployed operationally, the NIATF could operate under the control of the NCTC for counterterrorism missions to underscore its central, albeit emerging, role in fusing intelligence and operations in the war on terror. The DNSO could then direct the task organization of NIATF personnel in support of COMs, under chief of mission authority, as enhanced country teams, or in support of COCOMs in the form of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) under the direct control of the CCDR. The NIATF could also support other agencies in national security mission areas other than counterterrorism. For example, NIATF personnel could be detailed to State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CSR) to form integrated interagency teams for security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) missions. The key is that habitual relationships, supported by early and continuous participation in planning, training and exercises will enhance success in the field. These developments may require, as in the case of NCTC, an expansion of current missions.

Chiefs of mission also have access to external support to carry out the mandate to bolster partner capabilities: the State Department's own Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the long-standing tradition of using U.S. special operations forces (SOF) to train host nation militaries. The ATA program is coordinated by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DSS) and uses State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other government agency (OGA) personnel to provide counterterrorism training to selected foreign governments in five areas: law enforcement; protection of national leadership; control of borders; protection of critical infrastructure, and crisis management.²⁸ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides key support to this program. The program is highly prized by the recipient nations and U.S. chiefs of mission. However, current congressional funding only allows State to deliver this program to 12 countries annually. Furthermore, when the training is done, the ATA trainers

depart. This essay recommends that Congress significantly enhance the ATA program by increasing funding from \$5 million to at least \$50 million annually to increase the number of countries serviced to 30-40 annually and to permit a stay-behind capability for the countries posing the greatest terrorist threats to U.S. security interests.²⁹

Title 22 of the U.S. Code authorizes a Coordinator for Counterterrorism.³⁰ His staff forms the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT).³¹ S/CT executes key U.S. government counterterrorism responsibilities. For example, S/CT designates terrorist organizations and supporters of terrorism, selects countries for assistance via the ATA program, conducts diplomatic engagement, sets policy for the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), leads the interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), and provides friends and allies with counterterrorism finance training and assistance.³²

The FEST, established by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207 in 1986, is an interagency team that can deploy on short notice to U.S. diplomatic missions abroad to support chiefs of mission during times of crisis.³³ The FEST provides robust, worldwide and secure telecommunications capabilities and interagency personnel and equipment assets tailored to the crisis as determined by the chief of mission. Once deployed, the FEST interagency team works directly for the chief of mission.

S/CT also participates in the interagency hostage working group and serves as the co-chair for the USG interagency working group that leads USG Olympic Games security planning and execution. This interagency working group is known as the Interagency Athletic Event Security Coordination Group (IAESCG). The FEST and the IAESCG have established track records in real-world operations as well as in interagency training but have not been the subjects of external evaluation by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), participating agencies or academics. Such an evaluation is long overdue and Congress should direct the GAO to conduct such a study both to benchmark factors of success and to identify opportunities for improvement. Both the FEST and the IAESCG are examples of interagency organizations that permit interagency members to work directly for their parent organization with only occasional, but regular, participation in these interagency fora. But both are also examples of successful organizations built on clear agency responsibilities, habitual relationships over time, and excellent leadership. Initial research into possible improvements should include a focus on resourcing gaps. For example, Olympic security support almost always identifies unique funding requirements for each Olympic Games that are not included in any particular agency's annual budget.

Interagency Counterterrorism Capabilities Led by the Defense Department

The Department of Defense (DOD) employs both conventional and unconventional forces in the war on terror either directly under the command of the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) as in the case of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, under the direct command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in direct actions against terrorists worldwide, or under the direction of the chief of mission with DOD personnel operating from U.S. missions abroad.

One important initiative to achieve interagency integration in support of combatant commanders has been the development of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).³⁴ JIACGs provide experts, detailed from other government agencies, usually for three-year tours, to support COCOM operations advising them on how to coordinate with their parent agencies. JIACGs are now authorized and operating at all the combatant commands. However, there are several limitations on JIACG activities.

The three most important are the proscriptions by the Secretary of Defense, through guidance from the Joint Staff, against “making policy, tasking non-DOD personnel, or altering lines of authority and coordination channels already in place.”³⁵ For the most part, these limitations are prudent and, indeed, necessary. The other departments must have assurances that their voices will be heard prior to presidential approval of national plans and operations. However, the proscription against direct tasking, while logical in most instances, is misguided during certain field operations. Departments should understand that fast-paced field actions do not always lend themselves to checking with the home office and some limited circumstances must enable direct cross-agency tasking. The CENTCOM JIACG learned this lesson in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁶ Departments can, and should, grant such limited authority for the COCOM to directly task interagency personnel during operations in the field.

The use of special operations forces (SOF) personnel to train foreign military forces is a long-standing core competency of SOF and is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.³⁷ US SOF provide training to foreign partners primarily through three existing programs: Foreign Internal Defense (FID); the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) programs.³⁸ Due to their enormous value, these programs should be sustained in spite of the current high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of SOF forces conducting combat and GWOT operations around the globe. To compensate for current and potential future shortages of available SOF personnel for these missions due to operational deployments, DOD should use highly qualified former SOF contractors, who are

available in significant numbers, to perform these missions under the control of SOCOM and/or the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).³⁹

Establishing Enablers of Interagency Integration

This essay proposes establishing new enablers of interagency integration in five areas: determining and resourcing interagency staffing requirements; establishing a National Security University (NSU); reorganizing and expanding the National Exercise Program (NEP); institutionalizing interagency support of combatant command (COCOM) exercises; and establishing interagency interoperability in shared communications for planning and operations.

Determining and Supporting Interagency Staffing Requirements

Current methods of staffing interagency assignments must be reexamined and modified. These assignments all too often are ad hoc and temporary and, worse, often go unfulfilled.⁴⁰ In many cases, interagency assignments are viewed by the participants as having adverse impacts on their careers. This makes it difficult to attract the most qualified people for these assignments. Furthermore, most interagency assignments are not supported by increased staffing levels and funding by congress. These staffing problems exist in a number of organizations that rely on interagency staffing of key positions including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the COCOM JIACGs.⁴¹ The President should direct review of interagency assignments and seek congressional approval to increase department and agency staffing and funding for these assignments.

Congress may even wish to review a finding of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which proposed establishing service in interagency assignments as prerequisites for promotion to senior civil service and senior executive service positions within DOD, much as Congress required uniformed officers to complete joint assignments as a prerequisite to achieving general or flag officer rank, and consider extending such a requirement to other departments and agencies.⁴² This essay recommends that Congress study this question but falls short of endorsing the CSIS recommendation, cautioning that other non-DOD agencies may not have sufficient personnel to warrant such a restrictive barrier to promotion. This essay does, however, strongly endorse the CSIS recommendation for Congress to create a 10 per cent float for each agency to permit schooling and other developmental assignments while simultaneously enabling them to fill required positions.⁴³

This essay also recommends that Congress authorize a new category of federal employees known as National Security Officers (NSOs), modeled after the Foreign Service Office (FSO) corps of the State Department, who could perform duties across the interagency.⁴⁴

Just as with State's FSO program, the NSO program would employ highly selective entry criteria and as with DOD professional development programs, would include significant training and educational gates throughout the NSO's career. NSOs could be assigned to various agencies throughout their careers, thereby sharing best practices across agencies and inculcating an interagency culture through the USG. For example, a key objective of this program could be to spread expertise in operational planning throughout the USG where it exists largely only in DOD today.

Establishing a National Security University (NSU)

One obstacle to achieving a culture of interagency collaboration is the paucity of interagency educational opportunities.⁴⁵ This essay proposes the creation of a National Security University (NSU) to provide a world-class educational experience for USG employees with national security responsibilities. Such an effort would require a substantial commitment of resources but the return on investment would likely be extraordinary. The NSU could provide educational and training opportunities for junior to executive level employees of the federal government.

The NSU could be modeled after DOD's senior service colleges and should have a world-class faculty drawn from the various departments and agencies as well as academia. The NSU should be located in the National Capitol Region (NCR) to enhance access to decision makers and senior national security leaders. Finally, the design of the NSU should be accomplished with the participation of every organization with a stake in the enterprise and DOD's role should be limited to a supporting one.⁴⁶ In order to further enhance interagency support for this concept, NSU leadership positions should be rotated among all the departments and agencies.

The development of the NSU will require substantial funding. One course of action to limit this funding would be to convert DOD's National Defense University (NDU) to the NSU.⁴⁷ Such a change should not be approved without DOD support. This innovation would require presidential and congressional support.

Establishing Authoritative Guidelines for Interagency Coordination

Despite the fact that interagency coordination is not a new concept, there is very little written in the way of guidance for how to do it. Various presidential directives have altered the organization of the NSC and these documents have established some procedures for the conduct of meetings and the production of documents.⁴⁸ But a review of the literature reveals that the only extant guidance exists in the form *Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*.⁴⁹

These Joint Staff guidelines are very practical and could well serve as a basis for establishing authoritative guidelines for interagency coordination at the national level. However, it is worth noting that some of these guidelines are actually in conflict with one another. For example, *JP 3-08* notes that “Interagency forums established early at the operational level will enable close and constructive dialogue between the engaged agencies.”⁵⁰ Yet it also requires that COCOMs achieve consensus before engaging the interagency.⁵¹ These two guidelines clearly conflict. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Joint Staff to revise *JP 3-08* to emphasize early coordination. The SECDEF should expressly direct the elimination of the requirement to complete DOD planning prior to taking those plans to the interagency for coordination at the action officer level. The requirement for staffing of plans already in place by the NSC, and mentioned above, provide the principals the final review prior to presidential approval and protect agency interests.

Reorganizing and Expanding the National Exercise Program (NEP)

Presidential guidance to the interagency is also needed to reorganize and expand the National Exercise Program (NEP). The NEP provides a forum for federal, state and local exercises for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management training through the national Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercise series. Two specific recommendations are made here to reorganize and expand the NEP. First, the NEP should be reorganized by placing the DNSO in an oversight role while maintaining program execution by the Department of Justice (DOJ) which has done an outstanding job in reaching out to the interagency and state and local authorities in managing this program. This would allow the DNSO to direct the participation of various agencies, set program training objectives and provide presidential support for resourcing by Congress. This change in exercise oversight would enable training exercises to be synchronized with operational requirements by the same high level official, the DNSO, responsible for national security operational planning.

Second, the NEP should be expanded to include counterterrorism and all-hazards crisis management exercises in addition to its current weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management portfolio. One of the lessons learned from the TOPOFF 3 exercise conducted in March 2005 illustrates the value of these exercises.⁵² The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sent a senior watch officer (SWO) from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) to serve as a liaison officer (LNO) to the U.S. Embassy in London during this exercise. The DHS SWO established continuous communications with the HSOC in Washington, DC, and this effort identified a number of contacts made by the Government of the

United Kingdom to U.S. officials in the United States that were made without the knowledge of the chief of mission in London. The DHS SWO identified that the British Home Office had spoken, on several occasions, to the Secretary of Homeland Security and that certain commitments were being made by the U.S. government without consulting or informing the chief of mission in London or the State Department in Washington, D.C. This lesson learned instilled in the participants an appreciation for the need to establish interagency information sharing, especially in a crisis management situation where time-sensitive requirements can cause well-intentioned and experienced actors to inadvertently bypass other key USG actors.

Institutionalizing Interagency Support of COCOM Counterterrorism Exercises

DOD and the services have a long-standing tradition of conducting realistic training exercises. Indeed, this is a core military competency and well-ingrained in all the service cultures. The same cannot be said for the other departments and agencies of the federal government, especially State. This needs to change.

The geographic combatant commands (GCCs) and USSOCOM are required by CONPLAN 0300 to conduct counterterrorism exercises ranging from Level 1 exercises focused on the COCOM staff to Level 3 full-scale field training exercises.⁵³ Level 3 exercises are required once every three years. USSOCOM actually conducts Level 3 exercises semi-annually.

Interagency support to COCOM exercises is entirely voluntary. What is lacking and needed is presidential-level direction to support such exercises. Currently, Level 3 exercises for the GCCs receive robust, yet frequently inconsistent, support from the interagency to include deployment of the State-led, interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST).⁵⁴ Interagency representatives support COCOM forces on the ground as exercise participants and on the Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) providing exercise support writing realistic scenarios and serving as role players and controllers. Level 3 exercises also involve the direct participation of U.S. chiefs of mission and their respective country teams. But not all departments and agencies participate as frequently or with the necessary qualified personnel as would be desired.⁵⁵ The President should direct interagency participation and establish this effort as a national priority.

Establishing Interagency Interoperability in Shared Communications for Planning and Operations

Interagency integration is challenged by the continued absence of interoperable communications systems, decision support hardware, and software shared across the

interagency. These problems are particularly acute at U.S. missions abroad which have suffered from inadequate funding for years.⁵⁶ This problem must be addressed with a sense of urgency.⁵⁷

The absence of communications interoperability adds significant risk in achieving national security objectives. It increases the likelihood of miscommunications by slowing or even preventing the passing of critical information for decision makers.

To correct these deficiencies, the President should direct the completion of the necessary requirements analysis across the federal government and congress should authorize and fund the correction of this strategic interagency planning and operational fault line. A tool of proven value that is available immediately is DOD's Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) in use at each of the COCOMs today.⁵⁸ The fielding of CIE would permit departments and agencies to conduct real-time coordination using a robust and secure communications network to enhance situational awareness and to achieve a common operating picture (COP) among all participating departments and agencies. This effort should be done throughout the interagency and on a world-wide basis for U.S. missions abroad. Congress should provide the necessary authorization and funding as a priority item in the FY 2008 budget.

Conclusions

This essay has examined a number of issues challenging our ability to enhance interagency integration for the war on terror. The major findings are that the nation needs to develop a structure and process to monitor implementation of strategy and policy as well as a mechanism to permit interagency operational planning and execution. The essay also identifies opportunities to enhance existing capabilities and recommends the establishment of new capabilities to enable interagency integration for the GWOT. Fortunately, the departments and agencies appear to be converging in their policy and strategy statements regarding the need to improve unity of government effort in pursuit of national security and counterterrorism objectives. DOD, which will be a leading partner in these activities, with its acknowledged expertise in operational planning and execution and as the largest and most well-funded of the departments, appears fully ready to assume an active role in supporting the interagency in its efforts to enhance integration in planning and execution as evidenced by the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR)* which devotes an entire chapter to "Achieving Unity of Effort" within the U.S. government in pursuit of the nation's national security objectives.⁵⁹ Indeed, the 2006 *QDR* specifically advocates DOD's role in supporting its international as well its interagency partners.⁶⁰

Clearly, these recommendations will require a great deal of serious thought and bipartisan support by the President and Congress and will demand an investment of national treasure, but the return on investment will likely be high and truly enhance America's ability to integrate effectively all the elements of national power in pursuit of the nation's national security strategy and to ultimately win the war on terror.

Endnotes

¹ *National Security Act of 1947, Statutes at Large* 80, sec. 2 (1947). This section of the act states: "In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces."

² See Phillip G. Henderson, *Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy – From Kennedy to Reagan* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). Professor Henderson's work is highly valuable for its depth of scholarly research drawing especially on declassified notes, memoranda and agendas of the Eisenhower NSC. His conclusions citing the value of Eisenhower's management of the NSC significantly informed this paper. See also Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy," *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (Fall 2000): 3. For information on the inside workings of the NSC see Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson (Eds.), *Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council* (NY: Oxford, 2004); David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (NY: Public Affairs, 2005); and Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and the NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

³ *Ibid.*, 127-133.

⁴ Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (NY: Harper and Row, 1965), 304.

⁵ Ford reinstated the chief of the White House staff position after only a few weeks appointing Donald Rumsfeld to the position. Carter attempted to be his own chief of staff for two years before appointing Hamilton Jordan to the position.

⁶ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, Organization of the National Security Council System* (Washington, DC: The White House, 13 February 2001).

⁷ Observation based on the author's daily review of Deputies Committee meeting agendas while serving as the Chief of Operations, Crisis Management Cell, with the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT).

⁸ One possible indicator that groupthink does characterize the current administration is the consistent failure of the last two Secretaries of State (Powell and Rice) to challenge Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's position over the issue of chief of mission authority extending to certain SOF elements that operate from U.S. missions abroad. While the principals have debated the issue for four years, the issue has never been raised through the National Security Adviser to the President for decision.

⁹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002).

¹⁰ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003).

¹¹ Presidential directives under the administration of President George W. Bush fall into two categories: National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) and Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). Different presidents have labeled these policy documents with different names and many of these documents remain in effect from previous administrations unless specifically rescinded by the incumbent President. President Clinton labeled these documents as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) and three that relate to counterterrorism remain in effect including PDDs 39, 62 and 63. President Reagan called these documents National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs) and several remain in effect and are relevant to this study, especially NSDD 38 which establishes authority for chiefs of mission to staff and direct the activities of their country teams.

¹² U.S. Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2005).

¹³ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004).

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), *Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009* (U.S. Department of State and USAID: Washington, D.C., 20 August 2003). This document is available at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/>.

¹⁵ The *State Department Annual Performance Plan* is available at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/ris/perfplan/2005/html/29303.htm>.

¹⁶ Professor Alan G. Stolberg, Department of National Security and Strategy, United States Army War College, interview by author, 30 January 2006, Carlisle, PA

¹⁷ George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44), Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization* (Washington, DC: The White House, 7 December 2005).

¹⁸ Both the absence of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of strategy and policy and the existence of an operational planning and execution gap outside DOD are problems addressed in Clark A. Murdock, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 60-64. It is also commented upon in Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-*

Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 26-32.

¹⁹ One exception to this deficiency is the ability of chiefs of mission to exert authority over the interagency members of their country teams. This kind of unity of effort is lacking in many other fora, to include COCOM plans.

²⁰ See Stansfield Turner, *Terrorism and Democracy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), 31. In this work, Admiral Turner, who served as President Carter's Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), relates how in NSC discussions of courses of action to rescue the American hostages in Iran he purposely refrained from offering any policy recommendations in order to avoid the risk of compromising his role as the government's senior intelligence officer.

²¹ The Joint Warfighting Center, *Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment, Pamphlet 4* (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, February 24, 2004).

²² *Ibid.*, 4.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁴ *Organization of Department of State, U.S. Code, Title 22, sec. 2651a* (2004).

²⁵ *Foreign Service Act of 1980, Public Law 96-465, U.S. Statutes at Large 94* (1980).

²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *2004 Performance and Accountability Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November 2004). Available at <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/perfrpt/>. This report lists U.S. diplomatic posts for 2004.

²⁷ Examples include deployment of the FEST with significant law enforcement and intelligence assets in response to the Khobar Tower bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the bombing of the USS Cole in the Port of Aden, Yemen in 2001, and the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998.

²⁸ See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Fiscal Year 2005 Bureau Performance Plan for the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 2004), 15-19. Under the current ATA program the State Department develops Country Assistance Plans (CAPs) in approximately 12 countries per year delivering over 220 courses. See also *Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat* (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 23 May 2003), 106. (GAO-03-165).

²⁹ This essay merely provides a range of the number of countries that require assistance. The actual determination should be made by the NSC and would no doubt resemble the lists of supported countries in current classified GWOT plans.

³⁰ *Organization of Department of State, U.S. Code, Title 22, sec. 2651a* (2004).

³¹ The Coordinator holds the diplomatic rank of Ambassador-at-Large and reports directly to the Secretary of State. The letter "S" in the State Department office symbol of "S/CT" refers to

the fact that the office reports directly to the Secretary of State and not to the State Department as an organization.

³² Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Fiscal Year 2005 Bureau Performance Plan for the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 2004).

³³ Ronald Reagan, *National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207, The National Program for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, DC: The White House, 20 January 1986).

³⁴ Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 37, 2nd Quarter 2005, 11-12. Bogdanos points out that the Deputies Committee (DC) approved the decision to allow the COCOMs to create JIACGs and endorsed the concept of interagency staffing but never published a memorandum of agreement or issued any authoritative guidance to the departments and agencies to support this initiative. JIACGs grew out of an initiative by General (Ret.) Tommy Franks while commanding U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) who requested interagency assets to support his earliest operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz took the CENTCOM request to create an interagency coordination cell (later designated JIACG) to the National Security Council Deputies Committee and obtained consensus approval.

³⁵ Ibid., 12. See also U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Improving Interagency Cooperation in Operational Planning for Crisis Response* (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, September 22, 2003).

³⁶ Ibid., 13-14.

³⁷ *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, U.S. Statutes at Large* 75 (1961).

³⁸ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat* (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 23 May 2005), 120-123. (GAO-03-165)

³⁹ Private firms such as Blackwater and Triple Canopy, among others, employ large numbers of former SOF personnel who have performed these duties over the course of their former military careers. These same personnel have already been used in combat roles in Iraq and Afghanistan, so use in FID and JCET missions is feasible.

⁴⁰ DOD provides approximately 50 detailees to support the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and a small contingent of active duty and reserve officers to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

⁴¹ The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is staffed with detailees seconded from throughout the intelligence, law enforcement and special operations communities. Author interviews with colleagues at NCTC indicate that some detailees are concerned that their service in these positions of great responsibility will nevertheless be seen as detrimental to their career advancement. This tendency appears to be more pronounced in some organizations, such as the FBI, than among others. The COCOM JIACGs have never been formally directed by the President nor have the interagency positions on the JIACGs resulted in increased staffing

levels for the agencies providing officers for these assignments. The result has been uneven staffing. For example, the State Department positions on the JIACGs were intended to be filled by senior Foreign Service officers but in the first three years of the program this has not occurred. Indeed, some interagency positions have been filled by contractors. Granted, many of these contractors are experienced retirees from the organizations they purport to represent, and some still maintain excellent contacts with their former departments and agencies. However, this is not the same as having a sitting member of the department or agency who is still bound to that organization. DOD experienced some of the same problems when Defense Attaches serving in embassies abroad were for years limited in their promotion opportunities. DOD has corrected these problems in the Defense Attaché program and other government agencies would be well advised to take a similar approach so that interagency assignments can attract the most well qualified candidates.

⁴² Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams and Kurt M. Campbell, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 58-59.

⁴³ Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 40-42.

⁴⁴ *Idid.*, 55-57. The CSIS *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase I Report* recommends such a professional corps but only for DOD.

⁴⁵ Current educational opportunities exist for limited numbers of federal employees as students at the National Defense University (NDU) and the senior service colleges (the Army, Navy and Air War Colleges). Another program that provides outstanding interagency training over a five-day period is the Terrorism Response Senior Seminar (TRSS) offered by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). JSOU occasionally provides this training in Washington, DC, and opens the course for certain federal employees with responsibilities in national security matters. The curriculum follows a seminar format with guest speakers in counterterrorism, consequence management and homeland security. The U.S. Marshall Center in Germany and the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu offer programs for U.S. federal employees and foreign nationals in counterterrorism and other programs. Informal educational opportunities also exist in the counterterrorism community. For example, S/CT provides a half day seminar for U.S. Army Special Forces warrant officers and captains attending the SF qualification (Q) course. S/CT also provides this training to selected other DOD personnel engaged in counterterrorism operations. S/CT also offers incoming chiefs of mission the opportunity to deploy aboard FET aircraft to attend a one-day training event to view U.S. SOF capabilities and to meet with U.S. SOF leaders, to include the Commander of USSOCOM or his designated senior representative, at Fort Bragg, NC.

⁴⁶ For example, in order to keep the DOD footprint limited at the NSU the number of seats for DOD personnel could be restricted and perhaps the post of university president would only be made available to non-DOD personnel.

⁴⁷ Clark A. Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 121.

⁴⁸ For example, President George W. Bush reorganized the NSC with the publication of his first presidential directive, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1. NSPD-1 does provide guidance on meetings and production of documents but does not lay out any guidelines regarding the staffing of plans in the interagency process by the various departments and agencies.

⁴⁹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08, Volume I (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 9 October 1996).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ix.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, I-8.

⁵² The author served as the lead State Department representative at the American Embassy London for the TOPOFF 3 exercise in March 2005. In this capacity, he was the lead U.S. government observer/controller and facilitated the after action reviews for the Embassy country team and was the author of the formal lessons learned for this site of the exercise.

⁵³ U.S. Department of Defense, *CONPLAN 0300 (SECRET)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997).

⁵⁴ Several departments and agencies regularly support COCOM CT exercises, albeit with different levels of consistency and emphasis. The Department of State provides critical support. However, even though S/CT has participated in these exercises for years, at least for Level 3 exercises, and even though S/CT lists these exercises in its bureau Annual Performance Plan, S/CT has only recently been able to satisfy the requested levels of support from the COCOMs. The S/CT Operations Division provides the personnel for these exercises and S/CT Ops is a very small organization with only four civil service positions, five active duty military detailees and an Army Reserve Crisis Management Cell of 12 personnel. The most notable example of how this support can be less than required is the fact that State pulled out of one COCOM Level 3 exercise in 2005 citing less than realistic training in the planning stages of the exercises.

⁵⁵ The assignment of interagency personnel to support COCOM CT exercises can have significant impacts not only on the quality of the exercises themselves but as a tool for developing key relationships within the interagency. For example, the FBI tends to send the same Special Agents from the agency's Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), based out of Quantico, Virginia, to COCOM CT and TOPOFF interagency consequence management exercises. Because of this, the FBI reinforces personal habitual relationships with the representatives of other agencies. This is important operationally as well since the CIRG is the lead agency for the domestic variation of the FEST, known as the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST). The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) also tends to send the same officers to these exercises which further supports the development of these priceless habitual relationships.

⁵⁶ The State Department's *Executive Resource Book for 2003* (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2003) establishes that congressional funding for State Department operations has been limited since the mid-1980s due to congressional intent to limit the size and number of diplomatic posts worldwide. This report cites the *1986 Diplomatic Security Act*, Public Law 99-399, Section 103 which authorizes the Secretary of State to establish appropriate staffing levels

at U.S. missions abroad and establishes congressional intent to “reduce the size and possibly the number of U.S. Missions abroad for reasons of both security and economy.”

⁵⁷ Not all departments and agencies have access to a shared, interoperable and secure communications system. For example, some departments and agencies have access to secret information over DOD’s Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (SIPRNET) while others do not. Access to sensitive compartmentalized information (SCI) materials is even more limited as SCI facilities (SCIFs) and JWICS terminals are not conveniently located to support all the required users.

⁵⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command already employs a collaborative information environment (CIE) that provides a desktop capability that employs a variety of information technologies (such as Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) and secure video teleconferencing system of SVTS) and software applications (such as white boards and shared document write and review) to permit real-time collaboration at the interagency level. Not all the COCOMs are using the same CIE system and the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has avoided recommending any system as the preferred one. For example, the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) JIACG does not use the same CIE that is shared by USJFCOM, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). For detailed information on the DOD CIE system see The Joint Warfighting Center, *Operational Implications of the Collaborative Information Environment, Pamphlet 5* (Norfolk, VA: United States Joint Forces Command, 24 February 2004).

⁵⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 83-86.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 87-90.